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Rhode Island Interest
Culture of Quiescence
Carl T. Bogus*
I.
"People ask you for criticism, but they only want praise,"
W. Somerset Maugham wrote.' Anyone who has ever given or re-
ceived criticism recognizes the truth of that observation. Yet pain-
ful as it may be, criticism is essential. People and their
institutions are fallible, missteps are inevitable, and anyone who
does well has profited from mistakes. No one learns to ride a bicy-
cle without falling. The learner who tumbles off the bicycle does
not need to be told that something went wrong; gravity delivered
the message. But when we are dealing with complex matters
involving social or institutional relationships, it is often difficult to
know when one has lost her sense of balance. As Winston S. Chur-
chill put it: "Criticism may not be agreeable, but it is necessary; it
fulfills the same function as pain in the human body, it calls at-
tention to the development of an unhealthy state of things."
2
* Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law. I thank
Christian C. Day, Monroe H. Freedman, and Nancy J. Moore for their com-
ments on an earlier draft of this article; all errors, however, are my own.
© 2004 Carl T. Bogus.
1. W. SOMERSET MAUGHAM, OF HUMAN BONDAGE 241 (PENGUIN BOOKS
1992) (1915).
2. WILLIAM MANCHESTER, THE LAST LION: WINSTON SPENCER CHURCHILL,
VISIONS OF GLORY 1874-1932, at 348 (1983) (quoting one of Churchill's earliest
speeches in the House of Commons, in which Churchill defended his practice
of criticizing his own party).
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People who are overly protected from criticism come to a bad
end. Hans Christian Andersen teaches the lesson in his fable of
the "Emperor's New Clothes," in which a monarch ultimately pa-
rades naked because his ministers and courtiers were too timid to
tell him that they could not see his imaginary clothes. 3 Similar ex-
amples from real life are legion. Some believe that because Sad-
dam Hussein did not tolerate criticism well his advisors were
afraid to question his judgments that neither George Bush, father
or son, would attack Iraq.4
Some people are more vulnerable to a lack of criticism than
others, and among the most vulnerable are judges. After all, be-
sides their own staff, which is compromised mostly of secretaries,
tipstaffs, and awestruck young men and women fresh out of law
school, judges interact most often with the lawyers appearing be-
fore them. Saying that lawyers treat the judges with deference
fails to capture the interaction; it is more accurate to say that
lawyers bow and scrape. Some lawyers have elevated fawning to
an art form, pulling it off with subtle elegance. Others are gro-
tesquely obsequious. But few tell a judge she is wrong. There are
even developed techniques for avoiding such a calamity. One of my
mentors tutored me in how to handle the wholly irrelevant or fool-
ish question from the bench. The skilled advocate never points out
the problem with the question, he told me; instead she says "that's
precisely the point, your Honor," and proceeds quickly on with her
argument, as if what the judge said was not only prescient but
supported the advocate's thesis. This struck me as almost cruelly
unhelpful to a judge who is trying to sort out the complicated facts
or understand counsel's argument in a new case. But it is conven-
tional wisdom nonetheless.
The result of such treatment on the good men and women who
become judges is predictable. When they are first elevated to the
bench, newly appointed judges vow to treat parties and lawyers
better than they observed them being treated by other judges.
They vow to listen carefully and to be patient and courteous. They
3. See HANS CHRISTIAN ANDERSEN, THE EMPEROR'S NEW CLOTHES (Ran-
dom House 1975).
4. E.g., Arnold Beichman, Saddam's Mistake, WASH. TIMES, April 18,
2003, at A18 (opining that Saddam Hussein miscalculated because his "sub-
ordinates would not have dared utter a defeatist word lest they and their
families suffer").
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assume their new roles with a sense of dedication and humility.
The dedication frequently lasts; the humility is often dissolved by
years of unrelenting sycophancy. Treat someone as omniscient
long enough and he may come to believe it himself. People who
think themselves omniscient become impatient, disdainful, and
cantankerous. There is a name for the condition that ultimately
sets in - a name that lawyers use privately among themselves but
seldom mention publicly. It is "black robe disease."5 Lawyers may
snicker, but if judges have caught a disease, the lawyers were the
vector of the infection.
This essay is not about black robe disease, however. Black
robe disease is a universal phenomenon and my concern is about
something that may be peculiar to Rhode Island. I have mentioned
black robe disease first because one may better understand Rhode
Island's difference by beginning with a baseline problem. My the-
sis is that there is a strongly enforced taboo within the Rhode Is-
land legal culture against criticizing the state's governmental
institutions, particularly its courts. The targets and enforcers of
this taboo are one and the same: lawyers and judges themselves.
I am not sure whether this taboo is unique to Rhode Island.
Perhaps it is endemic to states with small legal communities. The
legal community with which I am most familiar is that of Phila-
delphia, where I practiced for eighteen years. I doubt that Rhode
Island lawyers are more unctuous to the judges before whom they
appear than their brother and sister lawyers in Philadelphia, or
that Rhode Island judges are more susceptible to black robe dis-
ease than their counterparts in Philadelphia. What I found differ-
ent between the two legal cultures, however, is the willingness of
the Philadelphia bar to speak out collectively and publicly about
perceived problems in the administration of justice, whether by
the courts or other instruments of government. Whenever there is
a serious problem in state or city government, the bar can be
counted upon to sound the alarm and lead the reform effort. In
some instances, the organized bar - the state or local bar associa-
tions - will take on the effort; in others, lawyers will help form ad
5. I heard this term many times while practicing law in Philadelphia
(1973-91). See also Murray Richtel, The Simpson Trial: A Timid Judge and a
Lawless Verdict, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 977, 978 (1996). For a further descrip-
tion, see CARL T. BOGUS, WHY LAWSUITS ARE GOOD FOR AMERICA: DISCIPLINED
DEMOCRACY, BIG BUSINESS AND THE COMMON LAW 248 (2001).
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hoc groups to take on an issue. But lawyers step forward even
when they know that their public efforts will not be greeted
warmly by judges, mayors, governors, governmental department
heads, agency administrators, or legislators.
That is not the case in Rhode Island.
II.
Shortly after moving from greater Philadelphia to Rhode Is-
land in 1996, I learned that the Rhode Island General Assembly
was appropriating to itself more and more control over adminis-
trative agencies. In the federal government and most, if not all,
other states, legislative control over executive agencies would be
considered to violate the constitutional principle of separation of
powers, but, as I was stunned to learn, the General Assembly, and
later the Rhode Island Supreme Court, claimed that Rhode Island
had never adopted the separation of powers. I have written else-
where about the substance of this issue6 and will not deal with
that here. Suffice it to say that many citizens considered Rhode Is-
land's repudiation of the doctrine of separation of powers to be the
state's most important problem and they developed a movement to
bring separation of powers to Rhode Island. Ultimately separation
of powers became the most visible issue in the state, and the
movement supporting it became so strong and wide that the Gen-
eral Assembly was forced, against its own self-interest, to approve
a constitutional amendment adopting the doctrine.7
When I first got involved, I expected the bar to spearhead the
movement. After all, who understood the doctrine of separation of
powers better than lawyers, who studied the grand theory of sepa-
ration of powers in Constitutional Law as well as the nitty gritty
of the doctrine in Administrative Law, and who observe daily how
things operate on the ground? I wanted to form a Lawyers Com-
mittee for Separation of Powers to publish newspaper ads, signed
by scores of attorneys, proclaiming the importance of separation of
powers within our constitutional structure of government; organ-
ize a speakers bureau of lawyers who would speak about the topic
6. See Carl T. Bogus, The Battle for Separation of Powers in Rhode Is-
land, 56 ADMIN. L. REv. 77 (2004).
7. See Liz Anderson, General Assembly Unanimously Approves Separa-
tion of Powers, Providence J., July 1, 2003, at Al.
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before community and school groups; and raise money for the nec-
essary political effort.
My experience led me to believe this would be easy. The legal
community with which I was most familiar was Philadelphia's,
where, since 1904, lawyers have led an energetic government
watchdog group known as the Committee of Seventy, which has
never shied away from controversial issues or hesitated to take on
the powerful. 8 Moreover, I am not sure I have ever been involved
in a cause that did not have a lawyers group advocating on its be-
half. Although the Vietnam War predated my admission to the
bar, I know that lawyers from Seattle to New York organized
groups such as the Lawyers Committee on American Policy to-
wards Vietnam 9 and the Lawyers Committee Against the War.10
When I became active in the nuclear arms control movement, it
was through the Lawyers Alliance for Nuclear Arms Control."
With respect to gun control, in which I have long-standing inter-
est, I am aware of gun control organizations established by law-
yers in New York,12 Pennsylvania,1 3 Arizona,' 4 and California.1 5
8. According to the Committee of Seventy website, the organization's
Chair, all three Vice Chairs, and ten of twelve members of the Executive
Committee are lawyers. See http://www.seventy.org (last visited Jan. 14,
2004).
9. See Passages, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 28, 2001, at A29.
10. See James A. Barnes, Bradley's Starting Lineup, 31 NAT'L J. 1978
(1999).
11. The organization has been renamed the Lawyers Alliance for World
Security. See David L. Wilson, Washington's Movers and Shakers; Changing
the World, 22 NAT'L J. 2560 (1990).
12. This group, the Lawyers' Committee on Violence, Inc., was estab-
lished by lawyers from some of New York City's largest firms. See Lawyers
Take Aim at Handgun Violence, N.Y. TIMES, April 12, 1994, at B2.
13. This group, the Voice of Reason, was formed by a lawyer who was
shot by a former client, in collaboration with the trauma surgeon who saved
his life. See Jo-Ellen Darling, A Life on the Mend, MORNING CALL (Allentown,
PA), Oct. 11, 1998, at B1.
14. This group is the Lawyers Committee Against Gun Violence. See
President of Handgun Control Inc. to Hold Press Conference in Phoenix Fri-
day, U.S. NEWSWIRE, May 18, 1995, available at 1995 WL 6617995.
15. San Francisco lawyers formed this group, the Legal Community
Against Violence (LCAV), following a madman's massacre at the Pettit &
Martin law firm in 1993. LCAV is an especially successful group, with affili-
ated lawyer groups in Illinois and Ohio. See Harriet Chiang, 10 Years After,
SAN FRANCIscO CHRON., July 1, 2003, at Al; Legal Community Against Vio-
lence website at http://www.lcav.org (last visited Jan 11, 2004).
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And there is nothing special about lawyers and these causes.
There is a Lawyers' Committee for Refugee and Immigrant Rights
in San Antonio, 16 a Lawyers' Committee for Consumer Rights in
Columbus, Ohio,17 a Lawyers' Committee for Better Housing in
Chicago,'8 a Lawyers' Committee for Urban Affairs in San Fran-
cisco, 19 a Lawyers' Committee Against Domestic Violence in
Brooklyn, 20 and more lawyers' committees for civil rights or hu-
man rights than I care to count. To fight cutbacks in the child wel-
fare system, lawyers organized a group provocatively called the
Colorado Lawyers' Committee Against Governor Roy Romer and
Karen Beye (the acting director of social services). 2' Lawyers are
among the first to work for the public good however they perceive
it, and no one should think that activism is the exclusive province
of liberals. Conservatives established the Lawyers' Committee for
Better Government in San Francisco,22 as well as the influential
Federalist Society (which, incidentally, was co-founded by a Rhode
Island native who was acculturated elsewhere into the legal pro-
fession).23
In my naivet6, therefore, I expected to rally Rhode Island
lawyers to the cause of separation of powers. Because it is a uni-
fied bar to which all lawyers must belong, the Rhode Island Bar
Association might be an inappropriate vehicle for an organized
lawyer effort, but surely, I thought, lawyers would man the ram-
parts through an ad hoc committee. More experienced hands
quickly disabused me of that notion. Rhode Island lawyers would
not, in sizable numbers, publicly challenge powerful elements in
16. See Maria F. Durand, Meiicans Smarting Under New Vigilance at
Border Crossings, SAN ANTONIO ExPREss-NEws, April 13, 1996, at Al.
17. See Kevin Mayhood, Ban Should Cut 2 Ways, Lawyers Say,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Dec. 5, 1997, at C1.
18. See www.lcbh.org (last visited Jan. 11, 2004).
19. See John King & Cathrerine Bowman, Brown Turns Political Tables
Again, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Jan. 17, 1996 at Al.
20. See Editorial, Lawyers Offer Program A Way Out for Abused Spouses,
POST-STANDARD (Syracuse, NY), Nov. 23, 1996 at A5.
21. See Carol Kreck, State Welfare Changes to Aid Foster Children,
DENVER POST, July 7, 1994, at B1.
22. See Kelly Flaherty, Dan Quayle: Lawyers are the Root of All Social
Need, THE RECORDER, May 20, 1999, at 6.
23. The Federalist Society was co-founded by Steven G. Calabresi. See
Terry Carter, The In Crowd: Conservatives Who Sought Refuge in the Feder-
alist Society Gain Clout, 87 A.B.A. J., September, 2001 at 47.
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the General Assembly or, following the Rhode Island Supreme
Court's startling decisions, criticize the court. Nor would they risk
alienating clients who benefit from the current system. This was
not something on which there was divided opinion; everyone I
talked to assured me that lawyers would sit on the sidelines. La-
mentably, they were right. It is my one regret about this struggle
that while a small number of lawyers were involved in important
ways,24 the bar was never a force in one of the most significant
movements in modern Rhode Island history.
III.
A.
In 1986, Professor Alan M. Dershowitz published Reversal of
Fortune,25 in which he recounts his successful handling of the ap-
peal of Claus von Bulow's 1982 murder conviction. It is not hard to
see why the book infuriated members of the Rhode Island bar and
bench. Dershowitz elevates himself (the Chicago Tribune's re-
viewer found the book "self-serving" and "self-aggrandizing"26 ) at
the expense of Rhode Island and its judicial system. As he por-
trays it, to prevail he had to be not only technically brilliant but
negotiate his way through an incestuous and corrupt system
where all the forces were arrayed against him.2 7
Rhode Island lawyers might understandably find Dershow-
itz's evidence for the latter proposition inadmissible not only un-
der rules of evidence but under the dictates of fairness as well.
Dershowitz makes a few specific criticisms based on his own ex-
24. The original proponent of the issue was Sheldon Whitehouse, who
advocated for separation of powers in the inaugural issue of this journal. See
Sheldon Whitehouse, Appointments by the Legislature Under the Rhode Is-
land Separation of Powers Doctrine: The Hazards of the Road Less Traveled,
1 ROGER WLIAMS U.L. REV. 1 (1996). Other lawyers active in the movement
include Alan Flink, Nicholas Gorham, Joseph Larisa (in his capacity as the
governor's chief of staff), James Marusak, and Kevin McAllister.
25. ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, REVERSAL OF FORTUNE: INSIDE THE VON BULOW
CASE (1986). I recommend the movie by the same name, starring Ron Silver
as a remarkably humble Alan Dershowitz, Glenn Close as Sunny von Bulow,
and Jeremy Irons who won an Academy Award for his portrayal of Claus von
Bulow.
26. Jon Anderson, Grim Tale is Wealth of Orgies, CHICAGO TRIB., July 22,
1986, at C3.
27. See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 25, at 52-54.
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periences, 28 but more often Dershowitz repeats disparaging state-
ments by others that appear to be based on nothing more than
gossip and rank speculation. Von Bulow tells Dershowitz that suc-
cess in Rhode Island courts depends on connections (although von
Bulow wants to cover his bets by adding Dershowitz, and thus
substance, to a legal team selected principally for its contacts).29
Von Bulow's lover says, "Rhode Island is the most corrupt state in
the nation."30 At one point in the story, Dershowitz hears rumors
that the attorney general's politically powerful relatives might be
lobbying supreme court justices to affirm the von Bulow conviction
in order to help the attorney general's political career. Are the
rumors plausible? Dershowitz straddles the fence. He suggests he
was skeptical yet adds, "but this was Rhode Island - a small-town
state whose level of political and judicial propriety seemed at least
a decade behind Massachusetts."31
28. For example, Dershowitz claims that there were repeated and de-
tailed leaks from the state supreme court about what its decision would be,
who would write the decision, and other matters; that the supreme court gave
the Providence Journal an advance, embargoed copy of its decision without
providing a copy to the parties; and that the superior court made several im-
portant decisions, including moving the second trial from Newport to Provi-
dence, "internally" and without either a request from the parties or allowing
the parties to be heard on the issue. Dershowitz, Reversal of Fortune, supra
note 25, at 143-45, 155, 180.
29. See id. at 54 (relating von Bulow's own description of what von Bulow
called the "Rhode Island Rules of the Game).
30. See id. at 215. What is the most corrupt state in the nation? See
Kevin McDermott, New State GOP Chief Has Tough Mission, ST. LouIs POST-
DISPATCH, July 29, 2002, at B1 (quoting the chair of the Illinois Republican
Party as stating that Illinois is "viewed as the most corrupt state in Amer-
ica"); The People Beat, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS, June 16, 2002, at J2 (quoting
movie director John Sayles as stating that "Florida is right up there with
Louisiana and Illinois as the most corrupt state in the Union"); Carrie Budoff,
Curry Claims Lock on Democratic Nod, HARTFORD COURANT, June 4, 2002, at
Al (quoting a gubernatorial candidate as stating that Connecticut is "the
most corrupt state in the nation"); C. Fraser Smith & William F. Zori, Jr.,
Governor's New York Fund-Raiser Criticized, BALTIMORE SUN, Aug. 10, 1996,
at 1A (quoting the chair of the Maryland Republican Party as stating that
Maryland had "a reputation for being one of the most corrupt states in the
country"); Alan Lupo, Defying Local Wisdom, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 10, 1990,
at 23 (declaring that Massachusetts is "the most corrupt state in the union");
Stuart Auerbach, U.S. Attorney in N.J. Resigns, Assails President, WASH.
POST, Sept. 13, 1977, at A7 (quoting the retiring U.S. Attorney for New Jersey
as stating that New Jersey "was universally viewed as one of the most cor-
rupt states, if not the most corrupt state, in the nation").
31. See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 25, at 154.
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The book's general attack on Rhode Island, such as it is, is in-
effective. The reader has no reason to believe that von Bulow, his
lover, or unnamed gossips know anything about the Rhode Island
justice system. Nora Ephron concluded her book review for the
New York Times by observing that Random House had just
thrown a midnight champagne party for Dershowitz and von Bu-
low at the Palladium Theater in New York City, and remarked,
"As for me, I'd rather be in Rhode Island."32 Therefore, while it is
understandable that Reversal of Fortune would annoy Rhode Is-
land judges and lawyers who are proud of the professional com-
munity to which they belong, the intensity of their reaction seems
overwrought, and the means they employed are disturbing.
The best known salvo was fired by Judge Ronald Lagueux,
whom President Reagan had just appointed to the United States
District Court for the District of Rhode Island, following Lagueux's
eighteen years on the bench of Rhode Island Superior Court. In an
interview in May of 1986, Judge Lagueux told the Providence
Journal that because of Dershowitz's "scurrilous" attacks on the
Rhode Island judicial system, Lagueux would never allow Der-
showitz to practice in Lagueux's courtroom. 33 Boston attorney
Harvey A. Silverglate, representing Dershowitz, sent Lagueux a
letter asking for the legal basis for banning Dershowitz from ap-
pearing in matters before Judge Lagueux and challenging
Lagueux to a debate on the matter. Lagueux never replied.
Had .that been the end of the story, the episode would have
been remembered as a single injudicious lapse. Judge Lagueux's
remarks were inappropriate, but people are known to lose their
tempers and say things they later regret. But the story resumed in
a most unexpected fashion. In a criminal case nearly a year later,
Judge Lagueux handed down an opinion denying defendants' mo-
tion to dismiss their indictments or, in the alternative, precluding
the testimony at trial of a government informant. 34 Counsel for
one of the defendants claimed that the informant told his client
that the substance of his testimony - that is, whether he would in-
culpate or exculpate the defendant - depended on whether their
32. Nora Ephron, Pulling Victory out of the Black Bag, N.Y. TIMES, June
15, 1986, Book Review section, at 9.
33. See Robert Safian, New England Egos on Parade, AM. LAW., July/Aug.
1989, at 149 (quoting a May 10, 1986 article from the Providence Journal).
34. United States v. Cooper, 662 F. Supp. 913, 920 (D.R.I. 1987).
2004]
360 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:351
client would pay him $250,000. Defense counsel persuaded the
U.S. Attorney for the District of Massachusetts to wire his client
for this conversation, which took place in Boston. The conversa-
tion was ambiguous, however. After four days of hearings and oral
argument, Judge Lagueux concluded that the informant had not
used his testimony as a cudgel to extort money but had instead
demanded payment of what the informant considered a pre-
existing debt, and done so without offering any quid pro quo.
One would expect that, in this run of the mill motion, the
most interesting aspect of the court's opinion would be the reason-
ing that led Judge Lagueux to credit one interpretation of the con-
versation over another. But that almost recedes into the
background. What blares more loudly is Judge Lagueux's blister-
ing attack on a particular defense counsel, Andrew Good, whom he
accused of maliciously setting up the informant. Judge Lagueux
argued that Good knew that the informant would demand repay-
ment of a debt, and that Good schemed to predispose the U.S. At-
torney to expect that the informant was instead soliciting a bribe
and then to mislead the U.S. Attorney and the court into believing
that is what occurred.
As it happens, Good was Harvey Silverglate's partner, and
Silverglate was involved in helping to persuade the U.S. Attorney
to record the conversation. In his written opinion, Judge Lagueux
took unexplained personal whacks at Silverglate. At one juncture,
Judge Lagueux described Silverglate as "a self-proclaimed expert
on greed, who was in on the planning of this bushwhacking;" 35 at
another, he wrote that Good devised the plan "with the help of his
name-dropping partner, Silverglate."36 The attacks on Silverglate
pale in comparison to those on Good, but they stand out nonethe-
less because they were personal, cryptic, and gratuitous.
At that stage, Good withdrew and was replaced as counsel
for one of the defendants. Attorneys for both defendants then
asked Judge Lagueux to recuse himself. In support of that re-
quest, one counsel, Norman S. Zalkind, submitted an affidavit in
which he stated that he believed that Judge Lagueux's attacks on
Good and Silverglate were "influenced by the judge's involvement
35. Id. at 916.
36. Id. at 917. Judge Lagueux added that Good and Silverglate "decided
that the sting could be accomplished if they involved the United States At-
torney's Office to do their dirty work for them." Id.
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in Professor Dershowitz's criticism of the Rhode Island judicial
system" and Silverglate's representation of Dershowitz in the mat-
ter.37 Zalkind argued that despite Good's withdrawal, he feared
that "a disqualifying lack of impartiality remains, in that your
Honor's obvious hostility extended to all counsel and by implica-
tion to the defendants." 3s Finally, in what would become the most
significant portion of the affidavit (as well as the most germane for
our purposes), Zalkind stated that he found Judge Lagueux's hos-
tility to counsel "a wholly convincing indicator of this court's per-
vasive and irremediable bias where criticism of members of the
Rhode Island bar is concerned in general and in particular, when
the issue is raised by Massachusetts attorneys associated in this
Court's mind with Prof. Dershowitz's earlier criticism."3 9 (Silver-
glate, Good, and Zalkind are all Massachusetts attorneys. Good
and Zalkind were both admitted pro hac vice; Silverglate did not
appear as counsel in the matter.)
Now, motions asking a judge to disqualify himself are, in my
experience anyway, quite rare. In my eighteen years of civil litiga-
tion I do not remember filing one. It is an understatement to say
they are likely to irk the judge. The judge has an obligation to
withdraw from a matter in which his impartiality might reasona-
bly be questioned,40 and a judge is likely to perceive a motion to
compel him to disqualify himself as an accusation that he has
failed to meet that obligation.41 Such motions are, moreover, ex-
37. In re Jonathan Cooper, 821 F.2d 833, 840 (1st Cir. 1987).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2000).
41. Congress amended the disqualification statute in 1974 to make
recusal easier. The rule is not designed to ensure merely an impartial tribu-
nal. It also is designed to promote public confidence in the fairness of the tri-
bunal by requiring a judge to step aside, notwithstanding an actual ability to
be impartial, whenever an objective observer might reasonably question the
judge's impartiality. Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S.
847, 864-85 (1988). Leading commentators have stressed that, under this
standard, lawyers may request that a judge recuse himself while at the same
time acknowledging that the judge is "pure in heart and incorruptible."
MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 241
(2d ed. 2002). Yet, human nature being what it is, a judge may still take of-
fense when counsel suggests that the judge, through his own conduct, created
the appearance of impartiality. In the case under discussion, the challenge to
judicial equanimity was even greater because counsel accused Judge Lagueux
of actual bias. Of course, under any scenario, the judge must do her best to
2004]
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tremely difficult to win. When alleging bias, as Zalkind did in ask-
ing Judge Lagueux to recuse himself, one must demonstrate either
that the judicial bias was pervasive and extreme or that the bias
stems from an extrajudicial source, that is, from a relationship or
events outside of judicial proceedings. 42 The judge is presumed to
be impartial; the party seeking disqualification has a "substantial
burden" to prove otherwise.43 And the statutory requirements for
requesting disqualification are strictly construed." For example,
although the statute provides that when a party files "a timely
and sufficient" request the judge against whom the motion is di-
rected "shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall
be assigned to hear such proceeding,"45 it has nonetheless been
held that the original judge has the discretion to determine
whether the affidavit supporting the request is legally sufficient
and that he need only refer the matter to another judge if he de-
termines that it is sufficient.46
Judge Lagueux held a hearing on Zalkind's recusal motion
himself and determined that Zalkind's affidavit was not suffi-
put aside feelings of annoyance and pride and rule on the motion as dispas-
sionately and objectively as possible.
42. The Supreme Court has held that, as a general matter, the "extraju-
dicial source doctrine" is implied within 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1), which requires
recusal when the judge has a "personal bias or prejudice concerning a party,"
because an unfavorable disposition toward a party is not bias or prejudice, as
those terms should be understood, if the disposition was derived from the
trial itself. Litkey v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 550 (1994). But the Court
has also held that there is what some call the "pervasive bias exception" to
the general rule. As the Court has explained:
It is wrong in theory, though it may not be too far off the mark as a
practical matter, to suggest, as many opinions have, that "extrajudi-
cial source" is the only basis for establishing disqualifying bias or
prejudice. It is the only common basis, but not the exclusive reason a
predisposition can be wrongful or inappropriate. A favorable or un-
favorable predisposition can also deserve to be characterized as
"bias" or "prejudice" because, even though it springs from the facts
adduced or the events occurring at trial, it is so extreme as to display
clear inability to render fair judgment.
Id. at 551.
43. Bin-Wahad v. Coughlin, 853 F. Supp. 680, 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
44. See, e.g., United States v. Occhipinti, 851 F. Supp. 523, 525 (S.D.N.Y.
1993).
45. 28 U.S.C. § 144 (2000).
46. See, e.g., Holmes v. NBC/GE, 925 F. Supp. 198, 201 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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cient,47 which was fair enough. And, as was quite to be expected,
Judge Lagueux was upset with Zalkind for making the motion.
Yet the vehemence of Judge Lagueux's counterattack on Zalkind
was stunning. He called Zalkind's affidavit "a scurrilous, scandal-
ous personal attack on the integrity of this Court," declared that it
was false and not made in good faith, ordered Zalkind to show
cause why he should not be found to have violated the Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility and have his pro hac vice admission re-
voked, threatened him with other sanctions including contempt,
and asked the U.S. Attorney to investigate indicting Zalkind for
perjury.48 Stating that Zalkind's affidavit contained falsehoods
warranting a perjury investigation was patently absurd. Zalkind's
affidavit made it clear that Zalkind inferred that Lagueux's hostil-
ity toward counsel was influenced by the Dershowitz affair, and
explained why he reached that conclusion. An expression of belief
of this kind (and Zalkind expressly and repeatedly used the word
belief) cannot possibly constitute perjury.49
Defendants then petitioned the First Circuit for a writ of
mandamus compelling Judge Lagueux to disqualify himself. The
First Circuit declined to issue the writ, most significantly because
the gist of Zalkind's allegations was that the judge was biased
against counsel rather than the parties themselves.5 0 The court
also seemed to give Judge Lagueux the benefit of the doubt that
the Dershowitz affair did not affect his conduct in the case.51
47. United States v. Cooper, 669 F. Supp. 38, 39 (D.R.I. 1987).
48. Id. at 39.
49. No statement can constitute perjury unless its truth or falsity is sus-
ceptible to proof. See, e.g., United States v. Endo, 635 F.2d 321, 323 (4th Cir.
1980). In the absence of Zalkind having expressly told someone that he,
Zalkind, did not believe that Lagueux was influenced by the Dershowitz af-
fair but that he was going to so aver anyway, there is no way to prove that
Zalkind lied about what he believed.
50. In re Cooper, 821 F.2d 833, 838 (1st Cir. 1987). The court noted that
"occasionally exceptional circumstances do arise where a judge's attitude to-
ward a particular attorney is so hostile that the judge's impartiality toward
the client may reasonably be questioned," but held that Judge Lagueux's fac-
tual findings in the case as they affected the parties "were not so beyond the
pale as to be suggestive of bias." Id. at 839.
51. See id. at 843-44. At the recusal hearing, Judge Lagueux explained
what he meant by his previously cryptic descriptions of Siverglate as a self-
proclaimed expert on greed and a name dropper. Judge Lagueux noted that
at the hearing on the motion to preclude the informant's testimony, Silver-
glate testified about his involvement in seeking the assistance, first, of a fed-
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Nonetheless, the court was troubled by what it called Judge
Lagueux's "highly charged" reaction to Zalkind's affidavit.5 2 The
court concluded its opinion with the admonition: "We would expect
that both counsel and court would strive to behave professionally
at trial."53
On remand, Judge Lagueux transferred to Chief Judge Fran-
cis J. Boyle, who was then the other federal district judge in
Rhode Island, the question of whether Zalkind should be adjudged
in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and to have
his pro hac vice admission revoked. 54 Judge Lagueux then used his
opinion explaining that decision as an opportunity to lash out at
Alan Dershowitz-the very person whom Lagueux claimed was
not affecting his judgment in the case. Judge Lagueux called Der-
showitz "a publicity-seeking law professor and sometime criminal
appellate lawyer who had criticized the Rhode Island judicial sys-
tem in a book, entitled Reversal of Fortune,"55 said that "[iln an ef-
fort to promote the sale of his book" Dershowitz told the media
that Rhode Island judges were corrupt,56 declared that "Dershow-
itz suffers from a spectacular lack of credibility,"57 castigated Der-
showitz for statements that Dershowitz made in his previous
book, The Best Defense,58 and said that Dershowitz's recent criti-
cism of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor showed that Dershowitz
"continues to use the technique of making unfounded attacks on
eral district judge in Boston, and subsequently, of the U.S. Attorney in re-
cording the conversation between defendant and informant. Silverglate testi-
fied he had told a DEA agent that the informant was likely to show up for a
second meeting because "greed can make people do ... bizarre" things.
Silverglate also testified that he called a particular federal district judge
(rather than another judge) because he had a relationship with the judge he
called, and that the judge had married Silverglate and his wife. Id. at 837
nn.1 & 2. Thus Judge Lagueux tried to show that his dislike for Silverglate
originated from the judicial proceeding itself and therefore was not the kind
of bias that requires disqualification.
52. Id. at 843.
53. Id. at 844 (emphasis added).
54. See United States v. Cooper, 675 F. Supp. 753 (1987). The discipli-
nary proceedings were heard by Judge Francis Boyle, who was then the only
other federal district judge in Rhode Island.
55. Id. at 754.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 754-55.
58. Id. at 754 n.3.
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the character of judges who do not agree with his position."59 That
was not all. Judge Lagueux described Harvey A. Silverglate as "a
Dershowitz friend, confidant, former student and disciple;"60 char-
acterized the letter that Silverglate wrote to him as Dershowitz's
counsel as an "infantile missive;"61 and said that in preparing his
affidavit in support of recusal, Zalkind "was following the Der-
showitz style of attacking the judge's integrity whenever an ad-
verse decision is rendered by a court."62
This is breathtaking. Attorneys defending a serious criminal
case allege that Judge Lagueux was so furious with Alan Der-
showitz for criticizing the Rhode Island judicial system that he
could not successfully keep those feelings partitioned off from his
judicial responsibilities. They claim his anger with Dershowitz
was transferred to any attorneys whom he perceived to be associ-
ated with Dershowitz in any fashion. They claim, further, that his
animosity against these attorneys was, in turn, so overwhelming
that they interfered with his ability to afford their clients a fair
trial. Judge Lagueux is outraged at what he views as an attack on
this integrity. He defends himself, in part, by explaining that his
indisputable dislike for these attorneys - particularly, Harvey
Silverglate - springs not from their association with Dershowitz
but from their own remarks63 and conduct in the case before him.
By the skin of his teeth, he escapes being ordered by the First Cir-
cuit to disqualify himself - in large part because the court accepts
his representations that his judicial judgment has not been influ-
enced by the Dershowitz affair. In light of this background, it is
astonishing that immediately upon remand, Judge Lagueux - ab-
solutely unnecessarily, and unrelated to anything before him -
brought up Dershowitz all over again, in an opinion that almost
seems calculated to demonstrate that the allegations in the motion
to disqualify him were right all along.
Judge Lagueux made some additional remarks in open court
when he informed the parties of his decision regarding Zalkind.
He said the attacks on the Rhode Island judicial system consti-
tuted "ethical violations" and "a fraud on the Rhode Island Su-
59. Id. at 756 n.4.
60. Id. at 755.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 756.
63. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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preme Court."64 He then reiterated what he had declared a year
earlier: "Alan Dershowitz will not be permitted to practice in my
courtroom."65 Based on these statements, Professor Dershowitz
filed a judicial misconduct complaint against Judge Lagueux with
the First Circuit.66 In response, Judge Lagueux sent the chief
judge of the First Circuit a letter, stating that Dershowitz filed the
complaint in order to intimidate him in the criminal case then be-
fore him. Judge Lagueux went on to state that he would refer the
matter to the U.S. Attorney, and that if the U.S. Attorney did not
investigate the matter he would appoint a special counsel to do
so. 67 The matter concluded with the First Circuit privately repri-
manding Judge Lagueux for what the court termed his "glaringly
injudicious" conduct. 68
No one questions that Judge Lagueux is a bright man.69 Why
would he undermine himself this way? With the exception of the
statement barring Dershowitz from practicing in "his" courtroom,
these were considered remarks that were made in writing, not
made in a flash of temper. Moreover, Judge Lagueux had three
months to consider the matter after the First Circuit handed down
its decision on the recusal issue. I suspect that he wrote what he
did because on some level he believed doing so served a purpose.
He was willing to sustain a self-inflicted wound for a greater
good.70 He believed, moreover, that others in his legal community
would see things the same way.
B.
Although the criminal case was terminated and the U.S. At-
torney urged Chief Judge Boyle to therefore consider the proceed-
64. See Safian, supra note 33, at 151.
65. See id.
66. Id. at 152.
67. See id.
68. See id.; David Margolick, At the Bar: A Glimpse at the Secrets of Pe-
nalizing Judges, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1989, at Al; see also John H. Kennedy,
Dershowitz Case Documents Made Public, BOSTON GLOBE, July 19, 1989, at
18.
69. In two published surveys, lawyers unanimously attested to Judge
Lagueux's high intelligence. See Safian, supra note 32, at 150; 1 ALMANAC OF
THE FEDERAL JuDIcIARY, 71 (First Circuit, Aspen Publishers, 2004).
70. Alan Dershowitz told the press that he believed Judge Lagueux
threatened him with an obstruction of justice investigation "to terrorize and
frighten other lawyers." See Safian, supra note 32, at 152.
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ing against Norman S. Zalkind to be moot, Judge Boyle proceeded
nonetheless with a disciplinary hearing. Judge Boyle found that
Zalkind filed the motion to disqualify Judge Lagueux solely for the
purpose of chastising Judge Lagueux for not believing Zalkind's
witnesses (with respect to why Zalkind sought to have the conver-
sation between the informant and his client recorded and whether
the informant demanded a bribe). "There could be no other pur-
pose since it is obvious to any sensible analysis that the motion to
recuse must fail from the outset," Judge Boyle concluded.71 He
punished Zalkind with a formal and public reprimand.
"It may be that Mr. Zalkind is a disciple of the belief that
Rhode Island justice is not of the quality provided elsewhere, but
this hardly gives him carte blanche to deprecate a judge without
any factual basis," Judge Boyle wrote. "It is simply not sensible to
believe that because Judge Lagueux had objected to [Dershowitz's]
blunderbuss attack upon the quality of the administration of jus-
tice in Rhode Island, he would, thereafter, find the testimony of
Mr. Zalkind's witnesses and associates to be incredible,"72 he con-
tinued.
Judge Boyle went on to find that Zalkind's statements consti-
tuted facts rather than opinion, and that they were "beyond fanci-
ful imagination" and made with reckless indifference as to their
truth, thus violating the proscribed ethical standards.
"Finally," wrote Judge Boyle, "it is this Court's conviction that
Mr. Zalkind harbors an acquired but unreasonable and unduly in-
fluenced bias concerning the quality of justice in this district."73
How did Judge Boyle know what Zalkind believed about the
quality of justice being dispensed in Rhode Island? Surely Zalkind
did not express such views in open court, before either Judge
Lagueux or Judge Boyle. And what was the relevance of Zalkind's
beliefs about Rhode Island justice?
As best as I can discern it, Judge Boyle considered Zalkind's
beliefs relevant because they explained his motive in seeking
Judge Lagueux's disqualification - that is, it was Zalkind's low
opinion of Rhode Island judges (federal and state) that caused him
71. See Zalkind Reprimanded for Lagueux Attack, RHODE ISLAND
LAWYERS WEEKLY, Feb. 29, 1988, at 1 (quoting extensively Judge Boyle's opin-
ion accompanying the Order and Reprimand).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 24.
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to believe Judge Lagueux had been improperly influenced by the
Dershowitz affair. But there are three problems with this reason-
ing. First, the analysis is entirely circular. Based on Zalkind's af-
fidavit, Judge Boyle inferred that Zalkind had a low opinion of
Rhode Island judges; based on Zalkind's low opinion of Rhode Is-
land judges, Judge Boyle inferred Zalkind's motive in submitting
the affidavit. Second, if Zalkind truly believed what Judge Boyle
assumed he believed, then Zalkind's affidavit reflected sincerely
held views, regardless of whether such views were objectively
true. Third, it is simply difficult to keep straight whether Zalkind
was punished for what Zalkind did, what Zalkind believed, or
what Alan Dershowitz believed. 74
Zalkind appealed Judge Boyle's reprimand, and on March 31,
1989, the First Circuit reversed.7 5 The court wrote:
A motion to recuse a trial judge is inherently offensive to
the sitting judge because it requires the moving party to
allege and substantiate bias and prejudice - traits con-
trary to the impartiality expected from a mortal cloaked
in judicial robe. Yet the fair administration of justice re-
quires that lawyers challenge a judge's purported impar-
tiality when facts arise which suggest the judge has
exhibited bias or prejudice.7 6
The court found that Zalkind had employed the proper pro-
cedure for challenging Judge Lagueux's impartiality,77 that there
was no evidence that he had not done so in good faith,78 and that
the decorum of the courtroom had been maintained during the
process.7 9 The court concluded that "[1]awyers using professional
care, circumspection and discretion in exercising that right need
not be apprehensive of chastisement or penalties for having the
advocative courage to raise such a sensitive issue to assure the cli-
74. If Judge Boyle did not engage in circular reasoning with respect to
Zalkind's affidavit, then how did he presume to know what Zalkind believed?
The only possibility that occurs to me is that he confused Zalkind's beliefs
with Alan Dershowitz's statements.
75. United States v. Cooper (In re Zalkind), 872 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1989).
76. Id. at 3-4.
77. Id. at4.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 3.
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ent's right to a fair trial and the integrity of our system for admin-
istering justice."80
In 1989, the National Association of Criminal Defense Law-
yers awarded Norman S. Zalkind its Champion of Liberty Award
for his courage in not succumbing to the retaliatory measures by
Judges Lagueux and Boyle.81
C.
At about the time Judge Lagueux first told the Providence
Journal that he would not permit Dershowitz to practice in "his"
courtroom, Judge Lagueux, together with two other co-sponsors,
asked the Harvard Law Association of Rhode Island to adopt a
resolution condemning Professor Dershowitz "for his recent
statements concerning the Rhode Island Bench and Bar."8 2 After
discussion, the resolution was adopted by a vote of 25 to 0. The
resolution said Dershowitz's statements were "totally uninformed
and betray a judgmental recklessness unbecoming a prominent
representative of a quality law school."8 3 That might be hard to
quarrel with. But what is disturbing about the Association's action
was that it hinted that then Harvard Law School Dean Vorenberg,
to whom the Association sent the resolution, ought to somehow
sanction Dershowitz.
One sentence reads: "The Association believes that Professor
Dershowitz's conduct reflects adversely on Harvard Law School
and its attitude toward the judiciary and the professional respon-
sibility of members of the Bar."84 The resolution contains two con-
flated implications. First, it implies that Dershowitz's statements
are not merely wrong, ill-considered, or irresponsible but violate
Dershowitz's professional responsibilities as a lawyer. Second, it
implies that Harvard Law School has a responsibility to protect
80. Id. at 5.
81. Telephone interview with Norman S. Zalkind, Member, Zalkind Rod-
riguez Lunt & Duncan, LLP (Oct. 8, 2003). See also www.zrld.com/nor-
manza.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2004).
82. Local Harvard Alums Blast Dershowitz, RHODE ISLAND LAWYERS
WEEKLY, June 2, 1986, at 1 (quoting the resolution). The other co-sponsors
were Family Court Chief Judge William R. Goldberg and attorney William F.
McMahon. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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"its attitude toward the judiciary" by policing comments by fac-
ulty.8 5
In his reply to the Association, Dean Vorenberg said he was
unclear about how Professor Dershowitz's conduct reflected ad-
versely on the law school and he was "particularly puzzled" by the
suggestion that "the Law School's attitude toward the Rhode Is-
land Bench and Bar is involved." 6 He went on to say that the
Harvard Law School tradition,
is that the Law School's duty to the profession and to so-
ciety in general is best served by not interfering with the
performance by individual faculty members of their duty
to the profession and to society according to their own
conception of that duty - so long of course as they fulfill
their responsibilities to the Law School .... Except in the
most exceptional circumstances, I believe that neither the
Dean nor the faculty should set themselves up as judges
of the appropriateness of the activity of individual faculty
members. That would disserve the spirit of free inquiry
that is the essence of what a law school is all about.87
On May 14, 1987 (ten days after Judge Lagueux held a hear-
ing on defendants' motion to disqualify him in the criminal case),
the Association adopted a second resolution.88 This one stated in
part:
WHEREAS, recently Alan Dershowitz a member of the
Harvard Law School faculty... has seen fit to make a
baseless and improper attack upon Judge Lagueux's per-
sonal character and judicial competence as well as to
make an unwarranted attack upon the judicial compe-
tence of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor of the Supreme
85. Although the resolution expressly makes neither point, it complains
about Dershowitz's "conduct" which, it suggests, constitutes a violation of his
"professional responsibility." The resolution also vaguely connects profes-
sional responsibility not only to Dershowitz but also to Harvard Law School,
suggesting, however obliquely, that the school has an obligation to control its
"representative." See id.
86. Letter from James Vorenberg, Dean, Harvard Law School, to Joachim
A. Weissfeld, Secretary, Harvard Law Association of Rhode Island (June 16,
1986) (copy on file with author).
87. Id. at 1-2.
88. Resolution For Adoption by the Harvard Law School Association of
Rhode Island (May 14, 1987) (copy on file with author).
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Court of the United States, merely because he disagreed
with one of her opinions ... the members of the Harvard
Law School Association of Rhode Island reaffirm their
confidence in and esteem for Judge Lagueux as an out-
standing member of the federal judiciary. .. and express
their deep regret and embarrassment that a member of
the faculty of the Harvard Law School should stoop to
such unwarranted and undeserved ad hominem at-
tacks .... 89
Again, the Association sent the resolution to Dean Voren-
berg.90
There is certainly nothing wrong with Harvard alumni, or
anyone else for that matter, criticizing Alan Dershowitz. The critic
is hardly immune from criticism. It would have been not only ap-
propriate but useful for the alumni to challenge the substance of
Dershowitz's comments. There were any number of ways they
could have done this. They could have taken Dershowitz up on his
offer to debate in Rhode Island or at Harvard;91 they could have
rebutted his comments in the op-ed page of the Providence Jour-
nal or the Boston Herald (where Dershowitz had published a col-
89. Id. at 1.
90. Dean Vorenberg apparently knew when he would merely be wasting
ink. This time his entire reply read: "Thank you very much for sending me
the Rhode Island Harvard Law School Association resolution." Letter from
James Vorenberg, Dean, Harvard Law School to Joachim A. Weissfeld, Secre-
tary, Harvard Law Association of Rhode Island (July 8, 1987) (copy on file
with author).
Professor Dershowitz, however, did write a reply, which began:
Your "resolution" makes my point about the old boy system of
injustice in Rhode Island and the unwillingness - or inability - of
the bar to criticize corruption in the judiciary far more eloquently
than I have been able to make it. Your pathetic resolution reminds
me of those issued by Soviet lawyers fearful of retribution and
anxious to please the higher ups.
I find it difficult to believe that any self-respecting lawyers
would demean themselves by stooping to the sycophantic behavior
which your resolution reflects.
Letter from Alan M. Dershowitz, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School to
Joachim A. Weissfeld, Secretary, Harvard Law Association of Rhode Island at
1 (July 14, 1987) (copy on file with author).
91. In his July 14th letter, Dershowitz offered to debate members of the
Association either in Rhode Island or before students at Harvard. Letter from
Alan Dershowitz to Joachim A. Weissfeld, supra note 90, at 1.
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umn criticizing Judge Lagueux and the Rhode Island justice sys-
tem), the Rhode Island Bar Journal, or if making noise in Der-
showitz's professional home was one of their goals, in the Harvard
Law Record or the Harvard Law Bulletin. Such an exercise might
have burnished the image of Rhode Island's judicial system and
demonstrated that Dershowitz's opinions were, as the alumni put
it, "totally uninformed." Or, conversely, it might have forced the
state's judicial system to confront weaknesses. It may have even
done both. One way or the other, however, a healthy debate on the
merits would have advanced the cause of justice in Rhode Island.
One would have thought that taking on Dershowitz on the
merits is precisely what would have come naturally to a group of
lawyers. Evidence, argument, and debate are their bread and but-
ter. The very last thing one might expect from Harvard Law
School alumni - who, surely, must appreciate the benefits of free-
dom of speech and academic freedom - is the suggestion that their
alma mater police faculty speech.
Regardless of whether the Harvard alumni wanted to take on
Dershowitz, however, their interest in the quality of justice in
Rhode Island should have made them consider taking on Judge
Lagueux. At the least, they could have privately counseled their
fellow member to, putting it colloquially, get a grip. It had to be
obvious to all that Judge Lagueux was so enraged by Dershowitz's
comments - and then by Zalkind's motion for recusal - that he lost
all perspective.
What the Harvard alumni chose to do instead was commend
Judge Lagueux during an episode of misuse of his office. 92
92. Judge Lagueux misused his judicial office by employing it as an in-
strument to attempt to punish a citizen (Dershowitz) for comments made out-
side the presence of the court or any judicial proceeding before him. He made
these attacks both from the bench and in court opinions. In so doing, he
treated a courtroom of the United States as if it were, as he himself described
it, "his courtroom." See supra note 65 and accompanying text. When judges
use their office to reach out - beyond any case or controversy before them - to
assert their personal views or punish citizens for expressing theirs, they
threaten the integrity of the judicial system, the rule of law, and constitu-
tional democracy. It is this, and only this, aspect of the episode that I charac-
terize as a misuse of office.
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D.
Judge Lagueux may have been reprimanded by the First Cir-
cuit, but the message he received from his own professional com-
munity - through the actions of Judge Boyle, the Harvard Law
School Association of Rhode Island, and perhaps privately by
other members of the Rhode Island bar and bench - was quite dif-
ferent. It would not be a surprise if, at the end of the matter,
Judge Lagueux saw himself as a martyred champion of Rhode Is-
land justice, someone who courageously defended the reputation
and integrity of Rhode Island courts against a celebrity law pro-
fessor and insolent out-of-state lawyers.
This has consequences. Consider the following. On September
5, 2001, lawyers representing a defendant insurance company in a
tort action filed a motion to disqualify Judge Lagueux from the
case. 93 They argued for recusal on two related grounds. First, they
alleged that when the action had been filed two months earlier,
plaintiffs counsel engaged in judge-shopping to have the matter
assigned to Judge Lagueux by improperly designating other cases
as "related cases" on the civil cover sheet. While there had been
other cases arising out of the same incident that had been handled
by Judge Lagueux, those cases had terminated and therefore, de-
fendants argued, could not properly be deemed "related" for the
purpose of having the new action assigned specifically to Judge
Lagueux rather than subject to the court's random assignment
system.94
93. Obert v. Republic W. Ins. Co., 190 F. Supp. 2d 279, 283 (D.R.I. 2002).
94. The court opinions make much of the fact that there were two civil
cover sheets. The original sheet, filed together with the complaint, did not list
any related cases, and the case was randomly assigned to Judge Mary Lisi.
On the next business day plaintiffs counsel filed an amended civil cover sheet
identifying the terminated cases as related cases, and the case was therefore
reassigned to Judge Lagueux. Instructions on the form state: "Related Cases.
This section of the JS-44 is used to reference related pending cases if any. If
there are related pending cases, insert the docket numbers and the corre-
sponding judge names for such cases." Id. at 287. See also Instruction VIII,
Civil Cover Sheet (Form JS-44, revised 3/99 and approved by the U.S. Judi-
cial Conference). For reasons that remain a mystery to me, Judges Lagueux
and Boyle believed that that defense counsel somehow impugned the integ-
rity of the clerk's office by raising the fact that plaintiffs counsel had filed an
amended civil cover sheet. The relevance of plaintiffs counsel going to the
trouble of filing an amended cover sheet, and listing terminated cases as re-
37320041
374 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:351
Second, they argued Judge Lagueux's impartiality in the new
case could reasonably be questioned because of comments he made
during both the prior and new cases. In one of the prior cases,
Judge Lagueux told defense counsel that he believed that a plead-
ing was frivolous and warranted sanctions, and promised that "the
day of reckoning will come." 95 The case, however, was settled, and
sanctions were never imposed. Shortly after the new case was
filed, Judge Lagueux held a conference in chambers to discuss
plaintiffs motion to restrain defendants from prosecuting a sepa-
rate action involving the same matter in federal district court in
Worcester, Massachusetts. 96 Defense counsel alleged that at that
conference Judge Lagueux stated that he would call the district
judge in Worcester and tell him to transfer that case to federal
district court in Rhode Island.97 They contend that when one of de-
fendant's attorneys, Roderick MacLeish, Jr. of Boston, attempted
to explain to Judge Lagueux why the matter belonged in Worces-
ter, Judge Lagueux refused to listen to him, stating that defen-
dants had made misrepresentations and false statements in the
past."98
I do not claim that defendant's version of the events were ac-
curate or that, even if they were, Judge Lagueux should have
recused himself. What is troubling is not the disposition of the mo-
tion but the intemperate manner in which it was considered and,
worse, the apparent effort - once again, by both Judge Lagueux
and another member of the bench - to retaliate against counsel for
making the motion.
Judge Lagueux declared that the affidavit of defense counsel
"is filled with misrepresentations, half-truths and outright false-
lated cases is that it evidences his desire to have the case assigned to Judge
Lagueux.
95. Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion of Defendant Republic
Western Insurance Company to Disqualify Judge Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 445, or, in the Alternative, to Transfer to Judge Lisi at 3, Obert v. Republic
Western Ins. Co. (D.R.I., Civil Action No. 01-324L) (quoting transcript from
May 25, 2000 proceeding in the prior case).
96. It appears that on the very same day (July 3, 2001) Republic Western
instituted an action in federal district court in Worcester, Massachusetts, and
Obert instituted an action against Republic Western in federal district court
in Providence, Rhode Island. See id. at 4.
97. Affidavit of Annapoorni R. Sankaran at 11, Obert v. Republic W. Ins.
Co. (D.R.I., Civil Action No. 01-324L).
98. Id. T 14.
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hoods."99 Yet it would be difficult for the dispassionate observer,
comparing Judge Lagueux's own version of the events with those
of defense counsel, to characterize either account that way.
For example, Judge Lagueux states:
[Tihe affidavit of Ms. Sankaran [one of defense counsel] is
filled with misrepresentations, half-truths and outright
falsehoods. This Judge has a duty to scrutinize the accu-
racy of the motion and affidavit and to determine the
credibility of the testimony. The parts of the affidavit
where Ms. Sankaran refers to the conference as a "hear-
ing" are false. She herself states in the affidavit that "the
hearing on Obert's motion for a temporary restraining or-
der was not held in Judge Lagueux's courtroom, but
rather in Judge Lagueux's chambers without a stenogra-
pher." This was an attempt to cast aspersions on the
Court. That attempt fails. It was an in-chambers confer-
ence and conducted in the manner that all in-chambers
conferences are conducted. 00
Judge Lagueux and Ms. Sankaran agree entirely on how this
proceeding was conducted, that is, it was a discussion between the
judge and counsel in the judge's chambers. The main relevance of
the form of the proceeding is that a court reporter was not in at-
tendance; therefore, a transcript is not available and defense coun-
sel can only set forth their recollection of the discussion. It is true
that informal meetings in chambers are generally called con-
ferences, but no one could fairly be accused of a falsehood for call-
ing the proceeding a "hearing" or a "conference." That is, at most,
a characterization of the proceeding, not a statement of fact.
What offended Judge Lagueux about Ms. Sankaran referring
to the proceeding as a hearing? Conferences generally deal with
procedural and housekeeping matters;' 0 ' they are, as one leading
treatise puts it, management tools.102 Because of the special na-
ture of temporary restraining orders, it was appropriate for Judge
Lagueux to decide that motion during an off-the-record confer-
99. Obert v. Republic W. Ins. Co., 190 F. Supp. 2d at 296.
100. Id. (citations omitted).
101. The purposes of pretrial conferences are listed in Rule 16 of the Civil
Rules of Civil Procedure.
102. JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIL PROCEDURE 428 (2d ed. 1993).
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ence. l0 3 And it was appropriate for him to discuss with counsel
procedural mechanisms for deciding where the dispute should be
litigated. 104 But it would not have been fair - only six days after
plaintiff filed his motion and before defendant had an adequate
opportunity to study, brief, and argue the issue - for Judge
Lagueux to make up his mind, not merely on the pending motion,
but on the permanent issue of venue. Yet, arguably, that is what
he did. According to Judge Lagueux himself, he not only declared
that both cases "belonged in Rhode Island for valid legal reasons"
but authorized plaintiffs counsel to communicate his view to
Judge Nathaniel Gordon, the federal district judge in Worcester. 105
Judge Lagueux would have jumped the gun at this juncture
by reaching a conclusion about venue, regardless of whether he
did so at an on-the-record hearing or an off-the-record conference.
I suspect defense counsel's use of the word "hearing" got under
Judge Lagueux's skin because, in his mind, it emphasized that he
had not confined himself to business typically conducted at confer-
ences. Judge Lagueux wrote that the "purpose of the conference
was to obtain input from the parties about the present action and
the mirror action pending in the District of Massachusetts." 10 6
103. At the conference, Judge Lagueux decided not to grant the request for
a temporary restraining order and to hold the request for a preliminary in-
junction in abeyance pending Judge Gorton's decision on a pending motion to
dismiss the case before him for improper venue or, in the alternative, to
transfer it to the District of Rhode Island. Because of their emergency nature
and short duration, temporary restraining orders may be determined solely
on the basis of the requesting party's affidavit or verified complaint. FED. R.
Civ. P. 65(b).
104. It was appropriate for Judge Lagueux to decide to wait for Judge
Gordon to rule on the venue motion before him, thereby avoiding the prospect
of both judges simultaneously reaching conflicting venue decisions. But
Judge Lagueux's decision to tell Judge Gorton that he believed both cases be-
longed in Rhode Island is another matter. I put aside the question of whether
it was appropriate for Judge Lagueux to relay his view of the venue issue to
Judge Gorton at all, whether via phone call, plaintiffs brief, or any other
manner.
105. Obert v. Republic W. Ins. Co., 190 F. Supp.2d 279, 296 (D.R.I. 2002).
106. Id. at 294. Judge Lagueux also stated: "Semantics aside, the only is-
sue before the Court was whether a temporary restraining order should issue
to prevent Republic Western from prosecuting the action in Massachusetts
because of the devious conduct of its counsel." Id. at 293. Although he was
upset that plaintiffs counsel "did not confine his remarks to the purpose of
the conference," Id. at 294, Judge Lagueux himself moved beyond this limited
purpose. Id.
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But, in fact, he did more than obtain input. When judges schedule
a proceeding for the purpose of hearing evidence and argument
and deciding an issue, they typically hold hearings, not confer-
ences. That is why he believed defense counsel "cast aspersions on
the Court"10 7 by describing the proceeding as a hearing rather
than a conference.
In her affidavit, defense counsel stated: "Judge Lagueux
stated that he was going to call Judge Gordon on the telephone
and tell him to transfer the case." 08 Judge Lagueux characterizes
this statement too as a falsehood. 0 9 Here is Judge Lagueux's ver-
sion of what occurred: "I told him in no uncertain words that I
could telephone Judge Gordon and state those views directly to
him but rather would leave it to Mr. Wistow [plaintiffs counsel] to
convey the message in an official brief (which Mr. Wistow has
done)."110 As anyone who has been a judge for many years must
realize, sincere people often have differing recollections of events.
Judge Lagueux must frequently hear witnesses describe the same
conversation differently without concluding that one of the wit-
nesses must be lying. The only difference here is that Judge
Lagueux was himself one of the witnesses. As a judge, he should
have been sensitive to the fact that because he remembered the
discussion one way would not mean that others could not genu-
inely have different recollections. This was a long and stressful
conference. No two participants could possibly remember it all ex-
actly the same way.
As it turned out, Judge Lagueux apparently wound up hearing only
plaintiffs counsel on the issue of venue. He writes that "Mr. Wistow pre-
sented his position that this Court should be the forum for all litigation in
this matter." Id. According to defense counsel, Mr. Wistow's presentation took
twenty minutes. Affidavit of Annapoorni R. Sankaran, supra note 96, 11.
When Mr. MacLeish attempted to reply, Judge Lagueux said he told Mr.
MacLeish "there was really nothing to address since the Court had decided
not to issue a T.R.O. and defer hearing on preliminary injunction .... He,
nevertheless, persisted. He was insolent and obviously trying to bait the
Court." Obert, 190 F. Supp.2d at 294.
As Judge Lagueux moved beyond the pending motions to the question
of venue itself, one can understand Why Mr. MacLeish wanted to be heard on
that issue. Judge Lagueux states, however, that despite repeated warnings
Mr. MacLeish attempted to address the merits of the underlying dispute.
107. Obert, 190 F. Supp.2d at 296.
108. Affidavit of Annapoorni R. Sankaran, supra note 97, 11.
109. Obert, 190 F. Supp.2d at 296.
110. Id. at 295.
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By no means do I question Judge Lagueux's right to decide
the facts of what actually was said, but how could he, and later
Magistrate Hagopian, possibly conclude that defense counsel were
lying rather than simply mistaken?11 '
Judge Lagueux denied the motion for disqualification, 112 and
in an unpublished, one paragraph per curiam opinion the First
Circuit declined to review that decision on an interlocutory ba-
sis. 113 Judge Lagueux also ordered the three lawyers from Boston
to show cause why their pro hac vice admissions should not be re-
voked, and he invited plaintiffs counsel to request sanctions
against all defense counsel (including two local counsel) for filing a
"a motion to disqualify that was not well founded in fact or in
law ."114
A hearing on both issues was held before U.S. Magistrate
Judge Jacob Hagopian. "In this case," Magistrate Hagopian wrote,
"attorneys for Republic Western Insurance Company ... at-
tempted to make something out of nothing in a deliberate attempt
to judge-shop, plain and simple. They misrepresented facts, made
baseless unsupportable arguments and wasted the time and re-
sources of the Court." 15 He found that Sankaran violated the
Rules of Professional Conduct and should have her pro hac vice
admission revoked, that MacLeish should attend ethics class
111. Judge Lagueux explained: "The Court credits the affidavits of Mr.
Wistow and Mr. Polacek [apparently in every respect] because those affida-
vits comport with this Judge's recollection of the events that occurred during
the August 9, 2001 conference." Id. at 293.
Why would defense counsel deliberately mischaracterize a conference
as a hearing or distort what Judge Lagueux said about calling Judge Gorton?
There was little, if any, advantage to be gained. Whether Judge Lagueux's
conduct at the proceeding evidenced a lack of impartiality is unaffected by
whether it is labeled a conference or a hearing. And if it was inappropriate
for Judge Lagueux to make up his mind about venue and communicate his
view to Judge Gorton, it was inappropriate regardless of the means of com-
munication. Moreover, defense counsel would not have expected their version
of the facts to prevail if they knew both plaintiffs counsel and the judge knew
it to be erroneous. Judge Lagueux and Magistrate Hagopian both ignore the
question of motive.
112. Obert, 190 F. Supp. 2d at 281.
113. In re Republic W. Ins. Co., No. 02-1476 (1st Cir. May 15, 2002) (deny-
ing defendant's petition for a writ of mandamus to compel Judge Lagueux to
recuse himself but stating that Republic Western was free to challenge the
disqualification ruling in an appeal at the end of the case).
114. Obert, 190 F. Supp. 2d at 300.
115. Obert v. Republic W. Ins. Co., 264 F. Supp. 2d 106, 112 (D.R.I. 2003).
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sponsored by his local bar association, 116 and that all five attor-
neys and their law firms should pay sanctions totaling $31,331.25,
representing plaintiffs reasonable expenses in opposing the mo-
tion to disqualify.117
The admonition that the First Circuit provided in the Zalkind
case that lawyers should not have to "be apprehensive of chas-
tisement or penalties for having the advocative courage to raise
such a sensitive issue" 1 8 as recusal has not been heeded.
E.
On October 17, 2003, in the midst of a high visibility civil jury
trial involving a black, off-duty police officer who was mistakenly
shot and killed by two white police officers, Judge Mary M. Lisi of
the federal district court in Rhode Island revoked the pro hac vice
admission of New York lawyers Barry C. Scheck and Nick Brustin
and declared that she would pursue sanctions against them and
plaintiffs local counsel, Robert B. Mann, at the conclusion of the
case. 1" 9 What provoked her ire was that she believed the lawyers
made "false assertions" about her own conduct in the case. 20
In order to resolve a dispute about whether they could use a
diagram in opening argument, Scheck and Brustin entered into a
stipulation with opposing counsel about the location of an auto-
mobile depicted on the diagram. Later they requested permission
116. Id. at 123. MacLeish received this additional sanction because he
was, in the words of Magistrate Hagopian, a "Rule 11 recidivist," having been
sanctioned fourteen years earlier by a federal district court in Florida for fil-
ing an amended complaint without "carefully reading and following the
court's directives" that the pleading clearly set forth (1) whether each mem-
ber of a town council and zoning board was being sued in an official or indi-
vidual capacity, and (2) what administrative activities, as opposed to
legislative activities, each defendant had engaged in. See DeSisto College,
Inc. v. Line, 888 F.2d 755, 761, 763 (11th Cir. 1989).
117. Obert, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 112.
118. United States v. Cooper (In re Zalkind), 872 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1989).
See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
119. See Edward Fitzpatrick, Judge Throws Scheck Off Young Suit
Against City, PROVIDENCE J., Oct. 18, 2003, at Al. Judge Lisi also said to
them: "Let me suggest to the both of you, don't ever come back on one of my
cases." Id at A9. See also Edward Fitzpatrick, Lawyer Agues for Mistrial,
PROVIDENCE J., Oct. 24, 2003, at Al; Tracy Breton, Judge Lisi Likes to Keep
Lawyers in Line, PROVIDENCE SUNDAY J., Oct. 26, 2003, at Al.
120. See Edward Fitzpatrick, Judge Throws Scheck Off Young Suit
Against City, PROVIDENCE J., OCT. 18, 2003, at Al. (quoting Judge Lisi).
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to be relieved of the stipulation, arguing that the evidence at trial
showed the automobile had not been located where they had stipu-
lated it had been. One sentence in their memorandum supporting
the motion reads: "Plaintiff, moments before her opening, was in-
formed by the court she had to agree to defendant's stipulation."121
In context, it was clear that what they meant was that Judge Lisi
would not let them use the diagram in opening argument unless
both sides resolved the dispute over the location of the automobile.
Scheck and Brustin felt they had faced a Hobson's choice: stipu-
late to the location of the car or do without the diagram in opening
statement. Scheck prepared an opening that relied on the diagram
and was flummoxed about how to revise it at the last moment.
Scheck and Brustin also said they had been genuinely confused
about the location of the car and relied on defendant's assertion
about its location. 122 They took care to point out that they were not
questioning opposing counsel's good faith. 123 But now that evi-
dence showed the car was somewhere else, they requested to be
relieved from the stipulation.
Their request was far from frivolous and their memorandum,
read in its entirety, was not disrespectful. Nevertheless, Judge
Lisi took offense at the literal meaning of the sentence quoted
above, that says Judge Lisi told counsel they had to agree to the
stipulation. "Your honor, I apologize," Scheck said in open court.
"You did not order us to go ahead with this stipulation." 24 But
Judge Lisi would have none of it. She revoked their admissions,
forcing local counsel to take over in mid-stream, and vowed to pur-
sue sanctions at the end of the case against all attorneys - Scheck,
Brustin, and Mann - who signed the memorandum.
Because it occurred in a high profile case, Lisi's action pro-
voked public reactions. Professor Alan M. Dershowitz upset the
local bar once again by noting that Zalkind, Silverglate, Sheck and
Brustin are all Jewish (as is Rhode Island lawyer Robert Mann)
and stating: "The fact that all of these out-of-state lawyers - so
121. Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Motion Requesting to be Re-
lieved from the Stipulation Regarding Exhibit 8, at 1, in Young v. City of
Providence (U.S.D.C., R.I., C.A. No. 01-288ML).
122. Id. at 1, 4.
123. Id. at 2.
124. Edward Fitzpatrick, Judge Throws Scheck off Young Suit Against
City, PROVIDENCE J., Oct. 18, 2003, at Al. (quoting Scheck).
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many of whom are Jewish - tend to get thrown off cases raises
very, very significant prima facie evidence of bigotry."125 The
Rhode Island Bar Association held a press conference to condemn
Dershowitz's remark, and Sheck, Brustin and Mann released a
letter to the press in which they too denouced Dershowitz's raising
the possibility of anti-Semitism playing a role in Judge Lisi's ac-
tion 126
The Providence Journal published three op-ed articles regard-
ing the Rhode Island federal district court's history of revoking pro
hac vice admissions by out-of-state lawyers. One was written by a
United Methodist Minister, and frequent court watcher, who ar-
gued that the pro hac vice revocations reflected a tradition of pro-
tecting the state's "closed shop."127 Another was written by the
administrator of the Rhode Island state courts, who maintained
that the courts were treating out-of-state and Rhode Island law-
yers alike and suggested that out-of-state lawyers were failing to
live up to the Rhode Island standard of practice. 128 The third and
most surprising op-ed was written by the chief judge of the federal
district court in Rhode Island, who suggested that out-of-state
lawyers were running into trouble in Rhode Island because they
came from more rough and tumble legal cultures and were not ac-
customed to the more civil atmosphere in the Rhode Island courts
and also decried the suggestions that Judge Lisi's decisions may
have been motivated by racial or religious prejudice. 129
The American Civil Liberties Union of Rhode Island (ACLU)
and the Rhode Island Bar Association (RIBA) requested permis-
125. Edward Fitzpatrick, The Young Case Takes Another Turn,
PROVIDENCE J., Nov. 16, 2003, at Al.
126. Edward Fitzpatrick, Bar Association Defends Lisi, PROVIDENCE J.,
Nov. 25, 2003, at Al. I personally know none of the four members of the fed-
eral bench discussed in this article, but as someone who was raised Jewish in
the area I believe it unlikely that anti-Semitism has been a factor.
127. Anne Grant, R.I.'s Quintessential Closed Shop, PROVIDENCE J., Nov. 7,
2003, at B4.
128. Thomas Bowman, In Defense of the Rhode Island Judiciary,
PROVIDENCE J., Nov. 16, 2003, at D8 ("Out-of-state lawyers who practice be-
fore our courts are treated in the same manner as if they were licensed in
Rhode Island. This means that they are expected to follow the same rules,
know the same Rhode Island law, and adhere to the same code of ethical con-
duct as Rhode Island lawyers.").
129. Ernest C. Torres, In Defense of Judge Lisi in Young Case,
PROVIDENCE J., Nov. 27, 2003, at C6.
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sion to file amicus curiae briefs regarding Judge Lisi's proposed
sanctioning of the attorneys. Without explanation, Judge Lisi
made the peculiar decision to accept a brief from the RIBA but not
from the ACLU. 130 One of my colleagues publicly speculated that
Judge Lisi wanted to hear only agreement with her actions and
expected, from comments their representatives had already made
to the press, that the ACLU would argue that sanctioning the law-
yers was unwarranted while the RIBA would take the opposite
position. 131 A slightly different explanation may be that the RIBA
has had a history of defending the courts from criticism while the
ACLU has been a frequent critic of the courts, so that, having
been acculturated in the culture of quiescence, Judge Lisi views
the Bar Association as a responsible organization and the ACLU
as irresponsible.
If Judge Lisi expected the RIBA to come to her defense, she
had to be disappointed. The RIBA filed a brief that, despite going
to pains to expressly take no position on whether the lawyers
made a misrepresentation, nevertheless left little doubt that the
RIBA thought they had not.132 The RIBA argued that sanctions
ought to be imposed for conduct that is qualitatively akin to con-
tempt of court and that evidences conscious bad faith, 133 that
briefs filed during the pressure of an ongoing trial are necessarily
prepared hastily, 34 and that it is important for the court to con-
sider plaintiffs memorandum as a whole and cautioned the court
against construing individual sentences separately or out of con-
130. Edward Fitzpatrick, Lisi Rejects ACLU Brief on Young Attorneys,
PROVIDENCE J., Dec. 4, 2003, at BI (reporting Judge Lisi denied the ACLU
request without explanation); Edward Fitzpatrick, Young's Lawyers Before
Lisi, PROVIDENCE J., Dec. 4, 2003, at Al (reporting Judge Lisi granted the
Rhode Island Bar Association's request).
131. Edward Fitzpatrick, Young's Lawyers Before Lisi, PROVIDENCE J.,
Dec. 16, 2003 at Al (quoting Professor Andrew Horwitz of the Roger Williams
University School of Law, who is a past chairman of the Rhode Island ACLU,
as saying the disparity in Judge Lisi's decisions "suggests she is only hearing
certain voices. Of course, the bar association held a press conference that one
could interpret as a defense of her, and then their brief gets accepted.").
132. See Rhode Island Bar Association's Memorandum as Amicus Curiae
at 1 n.2, 10, 11, & 13, Young v. City of Providence (C.A. No. 01-288ML) (ex-
pressly stating that RIBA takes no position on whether a Rule 11 violation
occurred in the circumstances of the case or, if it did, what the appropriate
sanction ought to be).
133. Id. at 3-6.
134. Id. at 6-8.
CULTURE OF QUIESCENCE
text. 3 5 Even with its careful avowal that it was not taking a posi-
tion on the substantive issues, within a culture of quiescence, the
RIBA's action in filing this brief was bold, and both the Associa-
tion and, especially, the lawyer who took responsibility for the
brief, Lauren E. Jones, deserve credit. At the same time, however,
it is important to observe that none of the members of the legal
community who were so quick to denounce Professor Dershowitz
for his diagnosis of anti-Semitism offered an alternative diagnosis
- or even acknowledged the existence of a malady.
Ultimately, Judge Lisi found that Scheck, Brustin and Mann
had all violated their responsibility under Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure by making a misrepresentation to the
court.136 This time, a federal district judge in Rhode Island overre-
acted not to something as personally difficult as a recusal motion
but to the mildest of criticism, if criticism it was at all. This hy-
persensitivity to criticism blinded her to both the law137 and the
case before her. Regardless of how the case came out, it was im-
portant for the parties and the community as a whole to believe
there had been a fair trial. But following other worrisome aspects
of the trial, 38 ejecting plaintiffs lead attorneys in the midst of a
135. Id. at 8-10.
136. Memorandum and Order, Young v. City of Providence, C.A. No. 01-
288ML (Feb. 11, 2004). See also Edward Fitzpatrick, Judge Lisi Censures
N.Y Lawyer Scheck in Leisa Young Case, PROVIDENCE J., Feb. 12, 2004, at
B4.
137. Judge Lisi believed that the lawyers who signed the memorandum
committed a Rule 11 violation by making a representation in bad faith,
namely, that she had pressured them into signing the stipulation. However,
the rule states: "A sanction imposed for violation of this rule shall be limited
to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct
by others similarly situated." FED. R. Civ. P. 11. With a panoply of other sanc-
tions available, terminating a lead lawyer's participation in an ongoing jury
trial violates the rule's admonition.
138. Plaintiffs lead trial lawyer was originally to be California lawyer
Johnnie L. Cochran, Jr. In a conference call on August 6, 2003, Judge Lisi in-
formed counsel that the trial would begin on October 7. Cochran told the
court he had a long planned vacation in Italy during that time and asked for
a delay of trial until October 20. Although Cochran made his request two
months in advance and asked for only a two week delay, Judge Lisi (irritated,
among other things, that Cochran referred to his time away as a "sabbatical"
rather than a vacation) denied the request. See Edward Fitzpatrick, After
Scheck's Dismissal from Case, Might Johnnie Cochran Return?, PROVIDENCE
J., Oct. 25, 2003, at A7. Thus, Judge Lisi looked as if she had deprived plain-
tiff of both her original and substitute choices of counsel. Further compromis-
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jury trial weakened the community's faith in the fairness of trial
and the tribunal.
IV.
A.
On April 4, 2003, I published an op-ed article in the Provi-
dence Journal about the battle for separation of powers in Rhode
Island. 139 One portion of that piece reads:
[T]he General Assembly argued that Rhode Island
never adopted the principle of separation of powers.
Counsel for the House told the state Supreme Court that
"under our constitution, the judiciary and legislative de-
partments are independent and coequal branches of gov-
ernment" but the "diminutive" executive branch did not
share the same status. The court agreed.
Not content with an unholy alliance between the legis-
lature and the judiciary to preserve their own status and
diminish the executive's, the people launched this effort
to amend the state's constitution. They have, in no uncer-
tain terms, demanded the traditional American form of
government, balanced on three legs.
Shortly thereafter, I received a letter from Chief Justice
Frank J. Williams, which reads nearly entirely140 as follows:
Dear Professor Bogus:
ing the court's image was the unfortunate selection of an all-white jury in a
case directly involving race. Those knowledgeable about the court system
may recognize that, in light of the state's demographics, this is neither un-
usual nor nefarious; nevertheless, it created a challenge for projecting the
appearance of fairness. See Gerald M. Carbone, All-White Jury Draws Heat,
PROVIDENCE J., Oct. 12, 2003, at Al (reporting the composition of the jury, the
selection procedure, the state's racial demographics, and quoting a leader of
the African-American community as saying, "With an all-white jury, there is
no trust").
139. Carl T. Bogus, Separation-of-Powers End Game: House Must Enact
Real Reform, PROVIDENCE J., April 4, 2003, at B7.
140. I have omitted one paragraph discussing testimony that the executive
director of Common Cause of Rhode Island gave to the state House Judiciary
Committee about pending separation of powers bills.
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While I appreciated your op-ed piece in the April 4th
Providence Journal, I found your comment suggesting "an
unholy alliance between the legislature and the judiciary"
to be gratuitous and destructive.
Certainly, I understand that the separation of powers
issue is a complex one and that even scholars of the
Rhode Island constitution may disagree on its interpreta-
tion. I welcome honest and thoughtful debate on the is-
sue; however your comments do not serve to further the
discussion. Rather, your comments suggesting sinister in-
tent lack civility and contribute to needless distrust and
cynicism among citizens of our judiciary.
You must know that those of us serving in an inde-
pendent judiciary strive to do so with honor worthy of the
public trust. I can assure you the Supreme Court seeks
truth and justice not political alliances. For you to sug-
gest otherwise impugns the character and integrity of the
members of the Supreme Court that considered the sepa-
ration of powers issue.141
The Chief Justice sent copies of the letter to all sitting mem-
bers of the state supreme court; Francis X. Flaherty, whose nomi-
nation to the court had just been confirmed but who had not yet
taken his seat; and Bruce I. Kogan, who was then serving as in-
terim dean of the Roger Williams University School of Law.
I replied as follows:
Dear Chief Justice Williams:
This is in reply to your letter of April 7, 2003.
I respect your desire to defend the Court and the good
names of your colleagues. I believe, however, that you are
unnecessarily attributing ad hominem meaning to my
comments, sharp as they may have been. Moreover, I do
not believe that my comments were gratuitous in the
sense that they constituted criticism without purpose.
141. Letter from Frank J. Williams, Chief Justice, Rhode Island Supreme
Court to Carl T. Bogus, Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School
of Law (April 7, 2003) (on file with author).
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Rather, they were directed at a matter of significant and
appropriate public concern.
In the sentence preceding the one you find offensive, I
noted that counsel for the House of Representatives urged
the Court to accept the view that "the judicial and legisla-
tive departments are independent and coequal branches"
but that the "diminutive" executive branch does not share
the same status. I do not believe there was anything ne-
farious in counsel advocating that position, and I do not
question that members of the Court made their decisions
in good faith, based on their analysis of the state consti-
tutional history and language.
Yet the legislature was able to tailor its argument for a
particular audience - a Court with a majority who had
deep personal or familial ties to the legislature. Two
members of the Court had been members of the legisla-
ture; another was married to a former member of the leg-
islature and current legislative lobbyist. Observing this
by no means suggests these justices do not, as you put it,
strive to do their jobs with honor worthy of the public
trust. I am confident that they do. Justices are, however,
human beings, and like all human beings their perspec-
tives and sympathies are shaped by their backgrounds
and relationships. This is hardly a new insight. The en-
tire Realist school of jurisprudence is devoted to studying
how judges' backgrounds affect their decisions.
Does it impugn the five members of the United States
Supreme Court who comprised the majority in Bush v.
Gore to note that they were all appointed by Republican
presidents? Is this an appropriate topic for public dis-
course?
There is another factor at play in Rhode Island. There
is reason to believe that the justices' relationships to the
legislature is not mere coincidence but the result of a de-
liberate legislative program. When in 1997 the House of
Representatives refused to confirm Margaret Curran for
Court, many found the professed reasons unpersuasive
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and believed that the more likely explanation had to do
with the looming issue of separation of powers.
Though my comment about an "unholy alliance be-
tween the legislature and the judiciary" related to the
state of affairs that existed when the Court handed down
its separation of powers decisions in 1999 and 2000, it
bears mentioning that concern about a legislative pro-
gram to shape the Court's composition is not merely his-
torical. Justice Designate Francis X. Flaherty's brother is
Chair of the House Judiciary Committee and someone
who played a prominent role in the House's rejection of
separation of powers last year. That hardly defines the
totality of Justice Designate Francis Flaherty, who has
had a distinguished political and professional career and
is highly regarded for his legal ability, judgment, and in-
tegrity. It does not demean him to express concern about
the continuing appointment of justices with connections
to the legislature.
Did the program to influence the Court's composition
(or, to put it more bluntly, to "stack" the Court) influence
the Court's separation of powers decisions? Perhaps no
one - even the justices themselves - can say for sure. Is
this an appropriate subject of public discourse? I respect-
fully suggest the answer is yes.
The sentence in my op-ed article to which you take um-
brage reads: "Not content with an unholy alliance be-
tween the legislature and the judiciary to preserve their
own status and diminish the executive's, the people
launched this effort to amend the state constitution." In
context both within the text of the op-ed and the history
described above, I believe that is a fair statement and
stand by it.
You may well disagree. That is your prerogative. But,
with all due respect, is it appropriate for the Chief Justice
of the state's supreme court to write a letter excoriating a
citizen who criticizes the Court and send a copy of that
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letter to the citizen's employer - as you have done in
sending a copy of your letter to Dean Kogan? What would
be the purpose of doing that beyond attempting to intimi-
date or punish that citizen?142
B.
In recent years there have been discussions about whether
there are racial disparities in criminal sentencing in the Superior
Court of Rhode Island. The Rhode Island courts commissioned two
studies on the issue. One study found a difference in perceptions
of fairness and bias among demographic groups, with Blacks and
Latinos holding a more jaundiced view than Whites and Southeast
Asians. A second study, known as the Jenkins study, found that in
fact there were no disparities in sentencing due to race. 143 The
courts issued a press release announcing the results and quoting
Chief Justice Williams as stating, "justice is truly blind when it
comes to criminal sentencing in Superior Court."144
At the request of the state American Civil Liberties Union
chapter, the Jenkins study was independently reviewed by other
academics with expertise in studying criminal sentencing. These
reviewers contended that the study was flawed because its sample
size (381 cases) was too small and it employed inappropriate sta-
tistical methodology. One reviewer wrote: "In my opinion, the re-
port is seriously flawed, and its conclusion ... is certainly
misleading and very likely incorrect."145 Two others stated: "In
conclusion, because of the methodological and statistical weak-
nesses of this study, we have little confidence in the findings pre-
142. Letter from Carl T. Bogus, Professor of Law, Roger Williams Univer-
sity School of Law, to Frank J. Williams, Chief Justice, Rhode Island Su-
preme Court (Apr. 14, 2003) (on file with author).
143. See Gerald M. Carbone, Survey: No Legal Bias Despite Minority Dis-
trust, PROVIDENCE J., June 14, 2002, at B1.
144. Press Release, Rhode Island Supreme Court, Perception and Reality
Differ in Court Studies on Racial Bias, (June 13, 2002), available at
www.courts.state.ri.us/pressreleases6-13-02racialbias.htm.
145. Letter from Leo Carroll, Professor of Sociology, University of Rhode
Island, to Steven Brown, Executive Director, American Civil Liberties Union,
Rhode Island Affiliate (July 22, 2002) (on file with author).
CULTURE OF QUIESCENCE
sented in the report."146 The ACLU released these critiques to the
press147
On October 22, 2002, the Rhode Island Civil Rights Roundta-
ble sent Chief Justice Frank J. Williams a letter about the issue,
signed by representatives of the nine state civil rights organiza-
tions.148 The letter asked the courts to commission a second sen-
tencing study, to record the race of criminal defendants in the
courts' computerized database to facilitate future studies, and to
insure compliance with a law requiring language interpreters for
non-English speaking defendants. It also urged the Chief Justice
to use his moral authority to advocate for a more racially diverse
judiciary. Although expressing serious concern and stating that
the "problems of race and criminal justice run deep,"149 the letter
was polite and respectful throughout. In no fashion did it question
the good faith of the courts, the Chief Justice, or anyone connected
with the judicial system.
In reply, Chief Justice Williams wrote, in part: "I feel com-
pelled to address my concern at the tone and stridency of your cor-
respondence," and "I am troubled that the Rhode Island Civil
Rights Roundtable seems so willing to take a confrontational ap-
proach to the Judiciary."'50
146. Letter from Stephen Demuth, Assistant Professor of Sociology, Bowl-
ing Green State University and Darrell Steffensmeier, Professor of Sociology
and Crime/Law/Justice, Pennsylvania State University, to Steven Brown,
Executive Director, American Civil Liberties Union, Rhode Island Affiliate
(Aug. 21, 2002) (on file with author).
147. See Gerald M. Carbone, ACLU: Court Study Flawed, PROVIDENCE J.,
OCT. 15, 2002, at BI; Bruce Landis, Civil-Rights Advocates Demand Fresh
Look at Race, Sentencing, PROVIDENCE J., Oct. 16, 2002, at B1.
148. Letter from Joseph T. Fowlkes, Jr., et al., to Frank J. Williams, Chief
Justice, Rhode Island Supreme Court (Oct. 22, 2002) (copy on file with au-
thor).
149. Id.
150. Letter from Frank J. Williams, Chief Justice, Rhode Island Supreme
Court, to Joseph T. Fowlkes, Jr. (Nov. 4, 2002) (copy on file with author). The
Chief Justice also wrote:
I am troubled that the Rhode Island Chapter of the A.C.L.U. did not
advise members of the committee [that commissioned the study] that
it was concerned about the study results. I am also troubled that the
A.C.L.U. did not advise the committee of its intention to send the
study out for "independent" review. I am troubled that the A.C.L.U.
grandstanded in a press conference without waiting for a response
from the study's author or allow participation of the Rhode Island
Judiciary.
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My colleague, Professor Andrew Horwitz, who supervises our
law school's criminal defense clinic and is active in the ACLU, was
prominently involved in the debate over the Jenkins study. The
Rhode Island Lawyers Weekly published an interview with Profes-
sor Horwitz in which he said, "based on my own perceptions and
based on common sense, there clearly are racial disparities in the
criminal justice system in Rhode Island."15' He also criticized the
state supreme court's decision not to commission a second study.
In a private chat shortly thereafter, a state court judge, seeking to
be helpful to Professor Horwitz, warned him that a number of
judges were upset with his remarks and that he ought to be care-
ful. The gist of the message, according to Professor Horwitz, was
watch your back.
V.
In a 1998 case, after receiving an unfavorable ruling from the
Rhode Island Supreme Court, two lawyers petitioned the court for
reargument. In their supporting memorandum, they wrote the fol-
lowing about the court's prior opinion:
The Opinion is a shocking display of judicial indiscretion.
It demonstrates judicial activism at its worst, in which
the Court first demonstrated what result it wished to
reach and then squeezed its rationale to fit the result.
The Opinion twists the facts and the law inappropriately
to fit the result that the Court desired. 152
This is boneheaded advocacy. Nothing is more unpersuasive
than insulting the very people one is trying to persuade. Moreover,
I do not quarrel with the court's view that this was "contemptuous
and demeaning" argument and that the "scorn directed at the jus-
tices of this Court" warranted sanctions. 15 3 What troubles me is
Id.
151. Professor: Courts Do Have Race Problems, R.I. LAWYERS WEEKLY, Nov.
18, 2002, at 1.
152. Memorandum in Support of the Rhode Island Ethics Commission's
Petition for Reargument, at 1, Clarke v. Morsilli, 723 A.2d 785 (R.I. 1998)
(C.A. No. MP 98-110).
153. Clarke v. Morsilli, 723 A.2d 785 (R.I. 1998). I do wonder, however,
whether the court would consider it contemptuous for an attorney to argue
that a lower court's reasoning was result-oriented, and if not, how the distinc-
tions are to be drawn.
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that, according to the court, the intemperate remarks "were the
primary focus of much of respondent's reply memorandum." 154
Why would opposing counsel bother spending time on them? The
remarks were sufficiently prominent by virtue of their nature and
placement in the very first paragraph of the memorandum that
the court could not possibly miss them. When someone has shot
himself in the head there is no reason to fire more bullets into the
body. If counsel felt the need to lament opposing counsel's disre-
spect for the court, a single sentence would have sufficed. But
counsel apparently thought he would gain the court's favor by
condemning opposing counsel at length. And he was right. The
court awarded him attorneys fees for this entirely unnecessary
time and effort.
To my mind anyway, by demonstrating once again an un-
healthy engrossment with punishing critics, which in this case in-
cluded rewarding those it viewed as helping it do so, the court did
its dignity more harm than good.
VI.
I do not place all of the vignettes on a par. Some, quite clearly,
are less serious than others. Nor am I suggesting that any of the
judges mentioned is a bad judge. On the contrary, there are attor-
neys who believe Judges Lagueux and Lisi are good jurists. 155
Judge Lagneux has displayed courage in fidelity to the law, 56 for
which I admire him greatly, and anyone acquainted with Chief
Justice Williams knows that he cares deeply about the state's ju-
dicial system and wishes to represent it well. These judges, how-
ever, reflect the culture in which they have spent their
professional lives. It is important to note that, with respect to fed-
eral district court, three judges (Lagueux, Boyle, and Lisi) and a
154. Id. at 786.
155. See lawyers' evaluations of both judges in 1 ALMANAC OF THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY, 69, 71 (First Circuit, Aspen Publishers, 2004).
156. In Easton's Point Ass'n. Inc. v. Coastal Res. Mgmt. Council, No. 84-
3737, 1986 R.I. Super. Lexis 50 (Apr. 21 1986), Lagueux, then a judge in
Rhode Island Superior Court, held that the doctrine of separation of powers
was incorporated in the Rhode Island Constitution. As he surely knew, this
decision would make him persona non grata with the state legislature and
destroy any chance to be elevated the state supreme court. For an explana-
tion of why this would be the case, see Bogus, The Battle for Separation of
Powers in Rhode Island, supra note 6.
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federal magistrate were involved in enforcing the taboo against
criticism. That is nearly half of all of the judicial officers in the
district, both active and retired. This is an institutional problem,
and that is how it ought to be addressed. 15 7
But the problem is not limited to federal district court. This is
a problem in the wider professional culture - a culture that
equates disagreement with confrontation, institutional criticism
with ad hominem attack, and anything that even smacks of per-
sonal criticism with contemptuousness. These are self-defeating
responses. In each of the incidents I have recounted, the judges
did more harm than good to their own reputations and to those of
institutions they sought to protect.
Federal district judges and Rhode Island Supreme Court jus-
tices are well armored against a critic's arrows. They have life
tenure. They do not need to worry about the next election; the ebb
and flow of popularity need not concern them. Indeed, popularity
cannot, and should not, concern them at all. As human beings, of
course, judges are understandably concerned with their profes-
sional reputations, but while popularity may rise and fall from
news cycle to news cycle, reputations are built and endure over
time.
Of course, what properly concerns judges most of all is the es-
teem in which the bar, the political branches of government, and
the public-at-large hold the judicial system. As is often said, courts
have no armies.'58 The rule of law depends on respect for the
courts. As the United States Supreme Court has put it:
As Americans of each succeeding generation are rightly
told, the Court cannot buy support for its decisions by
spending money and, except to a minor degree, it cannot
independently coerce obedience to its decrees. The Court's
power lies, rather, in its legitimacy, a product of sub-
157. I recognize that this is a difficult problem to acknowledge or address.
One hopes that, at a minimum, the judges in the U.S. District Court for
Rhode Island will collectively discuss the matter. One hopes as well that the
First Circuit will be cognizant that a special problem may exist in this dis-
trict and will carefully scrutinize appeals involving judicial retribution for
criticism.
158. See, e.g., Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Do Appearances Matter?: Judicial Impar-
tiality in Bush v. Gore, 61 MD. L. REV. 606, 610 (2002); Joseph W. Bellacosa,
Judging Cases v. Courting Public Opinion, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2381, 2396
(1997).
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stance and perception that shows itself in the people's ac-
ceptance of the Judiciary as fit to determine what the Na-
tion's law means and to declare what it demands.
The underlying substance of this legitimacy is of course
the warrant for the Court's decisions in the Constitution
and the lesser sources of legal principle on which the
Court draws .... Thus, the Court's legitimacy depends on
making legally principled decisions under circumstances
in which their principled character is sufficiently plausi-
ble to be accepted by the Nation.159
Hypersensitivity to criticism is counterproductive. As every-
one understands, thin skin is a characteristic of the insecure. I
write these words two days after Justice Anton Scalia recused
himself in the Pledge of Allegiance case. 160 Several months ago,
Justice Scalia spoke at an event co-sponsored by the Knights of
Columbus, an organization that lobbied Congress to include the
phrase "Under God" in the Constitution in 1954.161 In his speech,
the Justice said the lower court's decision was an example of how
courts misinterpret the Constitution to "exclude God from the pub-
lic forums and political life." Upon reading press reports of those
remarks, the plaintiff (representing himself) asked Justice Scalia
to recuse himself, arguing that it appeared the Justice had formed
a conclusion about the case and therefore his impartiality might
reasonably be questioned. If Justice Scalia ranted and raved about
plaintiffs impertinence in questioning his integrity he did so out
of public view. 162 What he did publicly was simply make what he
159. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865-66 (1992).
160. Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 328 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2002).
161. See Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court to Consider Case On "Under
God" in Pledge to Flag, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 15, 2003, at A14.
162. Subsequently, Justice Scalia denied a motion that he recuse himself
from a case in which advocacy groups sought information about the inner
workings of the National Energy Policy Development Group, chaired by Vice
President Cheney. Plaintiffs wanted to discover to what extent energy indus-
try officials shaped energy policy. The Sierra Club requested that Scalia dis-
qualify himself because, shortly before the case was argued, Scalia and
Cheney had been together on a duck hunting trip in Louisiana. As he himself
put it, Scalia "received a good deal of embarrassing criticism and adverse
publicity in connection" with the matter. Cheney v. U.S. District Court, 124
S. Ct. 1391, 1403 (2004). It would have been only human if Scalia were
peeved at Sierra Club's lawyers. And in his opinion, Scalia pointed out some
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thought to be the correct decision. 6 3 That is how a confident judge
preserves his dignity.
Substance as well as perception is at stake, for an institution
that cannot tolerate criticism is inherently unhealthy. A lack of
criticism leads inevitably to distorted self-perceptions. An institu-
tion that cannot hear criticism will lose opportunities to correct
errors and improve, and will never achieve its full potential.
The legal community's culture is created and preserved by
both judges and lawyers, but by virtue of their numbers alone,
mostly by lawyers. And, of course, most judges are acculturated
into the legal profession while still at the bar. To affect real
change, therefore, the bar must work consciously to change its
own culture, as difficult as this may be.
Lawyers need to stop supporting judges in punishing critics.
The Harvard Law School Association of Rhode Island did Judge
Lagueux no more of a favor than did the Emperor's ministers
when they failed to tell him he was wearing imaginary clothes.
Lawyers ought to think carefully before egging judges on to pun-
ish critics, even when the criticism has stepped over the line and
punishment might be appropriate. Courts can take care of them-
selves. The lawyer who spent time and energy to decry at length
opposing counsel's intemperate remarks about the court's prior
risy on the part Sierra Club's lead counsel, who during the same time period
had invited Scalia to California, at Stanford University's expense, to speak to
a class the lawyer was teaching. Id. at 1402-03. Nevertheless, even in these
trying circumstances, Scalia's opinion - though characteristically forceful
(and, in my judgment, flawed) - was neither mean-spirited nor unnecessarily
ad hominem. He decided the motion, explained his reasoning, and let the
matter rest.
163. He recused himself. For our purposes, however, there is no distinction
between recusal motions that should be granted or denied. If, for example,
the press had inaccurately reported his remarks and Justice Scalia decided to
not recuse himself, I doubt he would have excoriated the plaintiff for raising
the issue. Nor do I think he would have been offended because plaintiff did
not rely on him to do the right thing without giving him a nudge. For pur-
poses of sanctions, the only distinction is between colorable and frivolous mo-
tions. No attorney should be punished for filing a colorable motion, whether
for recusal or anything else. Recognizing the difficulty of being a judge in
one's own cause, the wise court will give attorneys the greatest benefit of the
doubt in precisely those matters that might be expected to get the court's
back up. Similarly, the confident court will be slow to interpret criticism as
insult.
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decision may have helped himself and his cause in the short run,
but he did so at some long-term cost to the legal community.
A number of years ago in federal district court in Philadel-
phia, a frustrated judge lambasted a young lawyer for something
that earned the judge's displeasure.
The mature and distinguished opposing counsel rose and
made remarks along the following lines: "Your honor, I hope you
will not hold what I am about to say against my client, but I feel
compelled to say that I have observed Mr. 's work throughout
this matter and I can tell you he has acquitted himself well. With
all due respect, sir, I believe the court's comments to him were not
warranted."'16 Now, this is directly criticizing a judge - indeed, a
judge who happens to be in the throws of frustration - and that is
always a risky undertaking. The safer approach is to sit still and
take the attitude that if opposing counsel is suffering an unjust
scolding, that it is his problem. Consider, however, how such an
episode shapes professional culture.
In writing this essay, I have puzzled over why so many inci-
dents involve out-of-state counsel. Do Rhode Islanders engage out-
of-state lawyers more often than citizens from other states? If so,
why? Do out-of-state lawyers behave differently than Rhode Is-
land lawyers? To what extent were protectionist attitudes among
Rhode Island lawyers and judges, who wish to exclude carpetbag-
gers, at work? Surely, part of the answer involves a clash of pro-
fessional cultures. It is not that out-of-state counsel treat judges
with less respect that their Rhode Island counterparts. In fact,
among all of the incidents that I have recounted, it was Rhode Is-
land lawyers only who could reasonably be accused of disrespect-
ful conduct.165 While wrestling with these questions, I was struck
by some comments by Robert B. Mann. Following the dismissals of
Scheck and Brustin, Mann, who had been local counsel, was sud-
denly thrust into the role of trial counsel. He moved for a mistrial.
164. Although I did not witness it, this incident was described to me by
the young lawyer who had suffered the tongue lashing. I remember the gist of
the remarks only, and use quotation marks to mark off the lawyer's state-
ment and not to indicate this is quoted verbatim. The incident occurred in
open court but only the judge, counsel, and court personnel were present. The
judge made no comment, and apparently did not hold the remarks against
counsel.
165. The incident described in section V.
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As part of his argument, Mann noted that he had also signed the
memorandum that offended Judge Lisi and was facing possible
sanctions at the end of the case. "I am somewhat chilled and
somewhat afraid of the specter of what is coming after the trial,"
Mann told Judge Lisi.166 Mann also said his client also "feels that I
am afraid or chilled in my advocacy." 167
I fear that Rhode Island lawyers practice law within a culture
that chills their advocacy all of the time. Out-of-state lawyers have
difficulty in Rhode Island because they were acculturated differ-
ently. They have not been ingrained with a strongly enforced ta-
boo against criticism, even appropriate and respectful criticism. I
can only wonder whether this has anything to do with Rhode Is-
landers wishing to retain out-of-state counsel. Rhode Island law-
yers are every bit as well-educated, experienced, and skilled as
lawyers from other jurisdictions. But they may be more chilled in
their advocacy, and perhaps, sensing that, Rhode Islanders engage
out-of-state lawyers they believe can be more forceful. If this is the
case, Rhode Island lawyers would benefit professionally and com-
mercially from culture change.
Even more importantly, Rhode Island and her citizens who
would benefit from culture change. The state needs Rhode Island
lawyers to be public critics of those aspects of the judicial system
they find wanting. From the many comments made to me, I know
that Rhode Island lawyers recognize that their professional com-
munity is plagued by the taboo against criticism. Many have told
me they are happy that there is now a law school in the state to
critique the judiciary. My colleagues will do their part, but it is a
mistake to count on us alone.168 Practitioners know the judicial
system best, and their criticism is indispensable.
166. See Fitzpatrick, Lawyer Argues for Mistrial, supra note 119 (quoting
Mann).
167. Id. (quoting Mann).
168. Although we are a prolific faculty, most of our attention is focused on
national (and international) issues. That is unlikely to change; academics get
more professional mileage out of addressing a wider audience. Nevertheless,
we will from time to time make our own contributions to the state justice sys-
tem. See, e.g., Andrew Horwitz, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases: The
Law and Reality in Rhode Island District Court?, 9 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L.
REV. 409 (2004); Robert B. Kent, Rhode Island Civil Procedure - Some Prob-
lems, 9 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 429 ( 2004); Larry J. Ritchie, Justice in
Rhode Island - Edson Toro and Procedural Default, 9 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L.
REV. 455 (2004) (all criticizing aspects of Rhode Island law).
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Rhode Island lawyers live in a culture in which criticism is
considered professional treason and punished by both courts and
colleagues. The culture cannot be changed without lawyers them-
selves stepping forward. Lawyers must become critics - thought-
ful, respectful critics to be sure, but critics nonetheless. I recognize
how difficult this will be. Rhode Island has a small legal commu-
nity, and a lawyer who antagonizes even one judge has saddled
herself with a significant professional handicap. There is strength
in numbers, however, and lawyers should act collectively through
their bar associations or ad hoc committees.
Lawyers are not merely legal technicians. They are leaders.
Half of the signers of the Declaration of Independence were law-
yers. 169 At this writing, half of all the nation's governors and
United States senators are lawyers. 170 Throughout the nation's
history, more than two-thirds of all presidents, vice presidents,
and members of the cabinet have been lawyers. The pantheon of
American lawyers includes Jefferson, Hamilton, Marshall, John
Adams, Daniel Webster, Lincoln - and in Rhode Island Thomas
Wilson Dorr and John Pastore. Lawyers - including the likes of
Mahatma Gandhi and Shirin Ebadi, the Iranian woman who re-
ceived the Nobel Peace Prize in 2003 - have been courageous
leaders around the world. Rhode Island needs its lawyers to pro-
vide leadership in the law and beyond. But leadership will never
adequately emerge out of a culture of quiescence.
169. For all percentages of lawyers in leadership roles, except where oth-
erwise cited see Carl T. Bogus, The Death of an Honorable Profession, 71 IND.
L.J. 911, 930 (1996), and sources cited therein.
170. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2341 (2003).
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